Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games

Weizsäcker, Georg (2003) Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 44 (1). 145 -171. ISSN 0899-8256

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (477Kb) | Preview

Abstract

Two behavioral models of two-person normal-form game play are presented and estimated, using three experimental data sets. The models are variants of the Quantal Response Equilibrium model defined by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, Games and Economic Behavior), but allow a player to hold inaccurate beliefs about the behavior of her opponent. Each model involves two parameters: One captures the player’s own level of response rationality, the other the level she attributes to her opponent. In order to allow for type heterogeneity among the subjects in the experiments, parametric distributions of these parameters are assumed. The estimation results indicate that the subjects’ choices follow a specific anomalous pattern: On average, subjects play as if they significantly underestimated their opponent’s rationality.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/geb
Additional Information: © 2003 Elsevier
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
Sets: Departments > Economics
Collections > Economists Online
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 31 Jan 2008
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/507/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics