Optimal sequential auctions

Jofre-Bonet, Mireia and Pesendorfer, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 (2006) Optimal sequential auctions. . Mireia Jofre-Bonet and Martin Pesendorfer.

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Abstract

Sequential sealed rst-price and open ascending bid auctions are studied. We examine which auction rule achieves the low procurement cost. We show that the answer to this policy question depends on whether the items are com- plements or substitutes. With substitutes, the rst-price auction is preferred, while with complementarities, the open ascending bid auction is preferred. We also illustrate the procurement cost minimizing auction and the auction rule preferred by the bidders. With substitutes, bidders prefer the open ascending bid auction, while with complements bidders prefer the rst-price auction.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 2006 the authors
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	20 May 2008 09:22
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 04:03
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4911

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