Arbitrage networks

Rahi, Rohit ORCID: 0000-0001-6887-9160 and Zigrand, Jean-Pierre ORCID: 0000-0002-7784-4231 (2008) Arbitrage networks. . Rohit Rahi and Jean-Pierre Zigrand, London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper is studies the general equilibrium implications of arbitrage trades by strategic players in segmented financial markets. Arbitrageurs exploit client`ele effects and choose to specialize in one category of trades, taking into consideration all other arbitrage strategies. This results in an equilibrium network of arbitrageurs. The optimal network for arbitrageurs is of the hub-spoke kind. The equilibrium network, in contrast, is never optimal for arbitrageurs and is never hub-spoke. The reason is that equilibrium networks suffer from a Prisoner’s Dilemma problem that prevents network externalities from being internalized. We show that, as the number of intermediaries grows, equilibrium allocations converge to those of the frictionless complete-markets Arrow-Debreu economy.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://vishnu.lse.ac.uk/Rohit_Rahi/Homepage.html
Additional Information:	© 2008 The Authors
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G12 - Asset Pricing; Trading volume; Bond Interest Rates D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D52 - Incomplete Markets
Date Deposited:	02 Mar 2009 15:39
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 04:03
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4787

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