Felsenthal, Dan S. and Machover, Moshé
The whole and the sum of its parts : formation of blocs revisited.
In: Holler, M. J., Kliemt, H., Schmidtchen, D. and Streit, M. E., (eds.)
Power and Fairness.
Jahrbuch Für Neue Politische Ökonomie,20
Mohr Siebeck, Tuebingen, Germany, pp. 279-291.
For any simple voting game (SVG), we raise the question as to whether forming a given bloc is advantageous. We consider this question from two different points of view as to what voting power means. We also distinguish between blocs imposed by annexation and those formed voluntarily. We illustrate our theoretical findings with examples using both toy SVGs and the QualifiedMajority Voting rule of the Council ofMinisters of the European Community.
||The authors gratefully acknowledge that work on this paper was partly supported by the Leverhulme Trust (Grant F/07-004m). Published 2002 © Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.
|Library of Congress subject classification:
||J Political Science > JC Political theory
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