Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2012) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 41 (2). pp. 331-343. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract

We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities. In other words, the game is non-zero sum because colonels have asymmetric and heterogeneous battlefield valuations. We characterize the colonels' payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/...
Additional Information:	© 2012 Springer-Verlag.
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HA Statistics
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
Date Deposited:	04 May 2012 08:50
Last Modified:	15 Nov 2024 09:24
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/43395

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