Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2013) Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case. Social choice and welfare, 40 (4). pp. 1067-1095. ISSN 1432-217X
In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or extended unanimity preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (Strategy-proof social choice on single-peaked domains: possibility, impossibility and the space between, 2002), Nehring (Oligarchies in judgment aggregation: a characterization, 2006), Dietrich and List (Soc Choice Welf 29(1):19-33, 2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (J Econ Theory 145(2):495-511, 2010a).
|Additional Information:||© 2012 The Authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management|
|Sets:||Departments > Government
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
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