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Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover

Anderson, Ronald W. and Bustamante, Maria Cecilia and Guibaud, Stéphane (2012) Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We study the relation between firm growth and managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when a long-lived firm is operated by a sequence of managers. In our model, firms replace their managers not only upon poor performance to provide incentives, but also when outside managers are at a comparative advantage to lead the firm through a new growth phase. We show how the optimal contract can be implemented with a system of deferred compensation credit and bonuses, along with dismissal and severance policies. Firms with better investment prospects have higher managerial turnover and rely on more front-loaded compensation schemes. Growth-induced turnover can result in positive severance if the principal needs to incentivize the manager to truthfully report the arrival of a growth opportunity. Realized firm growth depends jointly on the exogenous arrival of growth opportunities and the severity of the moral hazard problem. We also find a new component of agency costs due to the spillover effect of the tenure of the incumbent manager onto the present value of future managers’ compensation.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id...
Additional Information: © 2012 The Authors
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Sets: Departments > Finance
Date Deposited: 16 Apr 2012 15:57
Last Modified: 26 Jun 2012 15:45
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/43144

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