Gledhill, James (2012) Rawls and realism. Social theory and practice, 38 (1). pp. 55-82. ISSN 0037-802X
Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment.
|Additional Information:||© 2012 Florida State University|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
J Political Science > JC Political theory
|Sets:||Departments > Government|
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