Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies

Prat, Andrea (2002) Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Journal of economic theory, 103 (1). pp. 162-189. ISSN 1095-7235

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Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220...
Additional Information:	© 2001 Elsevier Science (USA)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	campaign finance; common agency; elections
Library of Congress subject classification:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M3 - Marketing and Advertising > M37 - Advertising D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Sets:	Collections > Economists Online Departments > Economics Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Rights:	http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/4075/

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