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Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies

Prat, Andrea (2002) Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Journal of Economic Theory, 103 (1). pp. 162-189. ISSN 1095-7235

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Identification Number: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2793
Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220...
Additional Information: © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA)
Divisions: Economics
STICERD
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M3 - Marketing and Advertising > M37 - Advertising
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Date Deposited: 03 Apr 2008 10:12
Last Modified: 02 Feb 2024 02:45
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4075

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