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Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies

Prat, Andrea (2002) Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Journal of Economic Theory, 103 (1). pp. 162-189. ISSN 1095-7235

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Identification Number: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2793
Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220...
Additional Information: © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 03 Apr 2008 10:12
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 08:51
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4075

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