Prat, Andrea (2002) Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Journal of Economic Theory, 103 (1). pp. 162-189. ISSN 1095-7235
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Identification Number: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2793
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220... |
| Additional Information: | © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA) |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M3 - Marketing and Advertising > M37 - Advertising D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Apr 2008 10:12 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 21:35 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4075 |
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