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Information structures in optimal auctions

Bergemann, Dirk and Pesendorfer, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 (2007) Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137 (1). pp. 580-609. ISSN 1095-7235

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220...
Additional Information: © 2007 Elsevier Inc.
Divisions: Economics
STICERD
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D44 - Auctions
Date Deposited: 01 Apr 2008 15:41
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2024 05:42
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4054

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