Felsenthal, Dan S. and Machover, Moshé
(1999)
Minimizing the mean majority deficit : the second square-root rule.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 37 (1).
pp. 25-37.
ISSN 0165-4896
Abstract
Let W be a composite (two-tier) simple voting game (SVG) consisting of a council, making yes/no decisions, whose members are delegates, each voting according to the majority view in his/her district. The council’s decision rule is an arbitrary SVG V. The mean majority deficit ∆[W] is the mean difference between the size of the majority camp among all citizens and the number of citizens who agree with the council’s decision. Minimizing ∆[W] is equivalent to maximizing the sum of the voting powers of all the citizens, as measured by the (absolute) Banzhaf index β'. We determine the V which minimize ∆[W]. We discuss the difference between majoritarianism and equalization of the voting powers of all citizens.
| Item Type: |
Article
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| Official URL: |
http://www.elsevier.com/locate/mss |
| Additional Information: |
Published 1999 © Elsevier Science BV. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate your private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. |
| Divisions: |
LSE |
| Subjects: |
Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: |
06 Oct 2005 |
| Last Modified: |
02 Oct 2025 16:42 |
| URI: |
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/400 |
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