Costa , Cristiano M., Ferreira, Daniel and Moreira , Humberto (2005) Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision. Economics letters, 86 (3). pp. 379-385. ISSN 0165-1765
Abstract
We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economics-letters... |
| Additional Information: | © 2005 Elsevier |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | organizational design, incentive provision, common agency |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M1 - Business Administration > M11 - Production Management |
| Sets: | Departments > Finance Collections > Economists Online |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/39856/ |
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