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Tournaments without prizes: evidence from personnel records

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi ORCID: 0009-0002-9237-2049 and Nossol, Mareike (2011) Tournaments without prizes: evidence from personnel records. Management Science, 57 (10). pp. 1721-1736. ISSN 0025-1909

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Identification Number: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1383


We use a quasi-experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance. The setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where, for exogenous reasons, management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity. We find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long-lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm. Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers' incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2011 Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences
Divisions: Management
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Date Deposited: 03 Nov 2011 09:21
Last Modified: 23 Apr 2024 04:33

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