Hortala-Vallve, Rafael 
ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X
(2011)
Generous legislators?: a description of vote trading agreements.
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6 (2).
pp. 179-196.
ISSN 1554-0626
Abstract
Legislators trade influence to attain the approval of their most preferred bills. A classic example can be found in pork barrel politics with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, in which logrolling agreements can load costs onto legislators excluded from winning coalitions. I model the bargaining amongst legislators as a repeated game and show that the outcome depends on the voters' relative valuations toward each bill. Most interestingly, I shed light on a vote trading outcome that has so far been overlooked in the literature; legislators most affected by logrolling agreements (those who bear costs with no benefit) may break such coalitions. Specifically, in equilibrium some legislators "generously" offer their support for bills that are not to their benefit, and obtain nothing in exchange.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.qjps.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2011 The author |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Oct 2011 09:31 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2024 09:24 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/39052 |
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