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Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems

Dietrich, Franz (2004) Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems. Journal of Economic Theory, 26 (2). pp. 286-298. ISSN 1095-7235

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.002


The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to “premises”, which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2004 Elsevier
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Date Deposited: 03 May 2011 11:38
Last Modified: 04 Jan 2024 02:36

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