Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems

Dietrich, Franz (2004) Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems. Journal of Economic Theory, 26 (2). pp. 286-298. ISSN 1095-7235

Full text not available from this repository.


The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to “premises”, which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2004 Elsevier
Library of Congress subject classification: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Sets: Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 03 May 2011 11:38

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only