Dietrich, Franz (2004) Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems. Journal of economic theory, 26 (2). pp. 286-298. ISSN 1095-7235
The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to “premises”, which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent.
|Additional Information:||© 2004 Elsevier|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic|
|Sets:||Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
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