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Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi (2007) Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse. Economics Letters, 94 (2). pp. 163-169. ISSN 0165-1765

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.024


I show that delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2006 Elsevier
Divisions: LSE
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2011 17:03
Last Modified: 20 Feb 2021 04:04

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