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Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi (2007) Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse. Economics Letters, 94 (2). 163-169 . ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

I show that delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information: © 2006 Elsevier
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Sets: Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2011 17:03
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/31523/

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