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Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi (2007) Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse. Economics Letters, 94 (2). pp. 163-169. ISSN 0165-1765

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.024

Abstract

I show that delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information: © 2006 Elsevier
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2011 17:03
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2012 17:54
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31523

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