Efficiency gains from team-based coordination—large-scale experimental evidence

Feri, Francesco, Irlenbusch, Bernd and Sutter, Matthias (2010) Efficiency gains from team-based coordination—large-scale experimental evidence. American Economic Review, 100 (4). pp. 1892-1912. ISSN 0002-8282

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Abstract

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present a series of coordination experiments with a total of 1,101 participants. We find that teams of three subjects each coordinate much more efficiently than individuals. This finding adds one important cornerstone to the recent literature on the conditions for successful coordination. We explain the differences between individuals and teams using the experience weighted attraction learning model.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php
Additional Information:	© 2010 AEA
Divisions:	Management
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, work arrangemetns, job satisfaction)
Date Deposited:	21 Oct 2010 13:44
Last Modified:	20 Nov 2024 01:48
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/29730

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