On the game-theoretic foundations of competitive search equilibrium

Galenianos, Manolis and Kircher, Philipp (2012) On the game-theoretic foundations of competitive search equilibrium. International Economic Review, 53 (1). pp. 1-21. ISSN 0020-6598

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Abstract

We provide a unified directed search framework with general production and matching specifications that encompass most of the existing literature. We prove the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the model. We use this result to derive a more complete characterization of the equilibrium set for the finite economy and to extend convergence results as the economy becomes large to general production and matching specifications. The latter extends the microfoundations for the standard market utility assumption used in competitive search models with a continuum of agents to new environments.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0020-6598
Additional Information:	© 2012 Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J0 - General J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J63 - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Date Deposited:	20 Oct 2010 08:30
Last Modified:	02 Oct 2024 04:21
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/29707

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