Hortala-Vallve, Rafael 
ORCID: 0000-0002-9677-497X and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
(2010)
Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games.
.
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Abstract
We analyse a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities (i.e. the game is non-zero sum). We characterize the colonels. Payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hortalav/DEFAULT_files/C... |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Jul 2010 12:41 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Sep 2025 04:22 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/28693 |
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