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Professionals play minimax

Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio (2003) Professionals play minimax. Review of Economic Studies, 70 (243). pp. 395-415. ISSN 0034-6527

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Identification Number: 10.1111/1467-937X.00249


The implications of the Minimax theorem are tested using natural data. The tests use a unique data set from penalty kicks in professional soccer games. In this natural setting experts play a one-shot two-person zero-sum game. The results of the tests are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play in every respect: (i) winning probabilities are statistically identical across strategies for players; (ii) players’ choices are serially independent. The tests have substantial power to distinguish equilibrium play from disequilibrium alternatives. These results represent the first time that both implications of von Neumann's Minimax theorem are supported under natural conditions.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2003 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Divisions: Management
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited: 11 Jan 2010 09:49
Last Modified: 20 Nov 2023 17:24

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