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What happens when you regulate risk?: evidence from a simple equilibrium model

Zigrand, Jean-Pierre ORCID: 0000-0002-7784-4231 and Danielsson, Jon (2001) What happens when you regulate risk?: evidence from a simple equilibrium model. Discussion paper (393). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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The implications of Value-at-Risk regulations are analyzed in a CARA-normal general equilibrium model. Financial institutions are heterogeneous in risk preferences, wealth and the degree of supervision. Regulatory risk constraints lower the probability of one form of a systemic crisis, at the expense of more volatile asset prices, less liquidity, and the amplification of downward price movements. This can be viewed as a consequence of the endogenously changing risk appetite of financial institutions induced by the regulatory constraints. Finally, the Value-at-Risk constraints may prevent market clearing altogether. The role of unregulated institutions (hedge-funds) is considered. The findings are illustrated with an application to the 1987 and 1998 crises.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2001 The Authors
Divisions: Financial Markets Group
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G12 - Asset Pricing; Trading volume; Bond Interest Rates
D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D50 - General
G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General
Date Deposited: 06 Jan 2010 13:48
Last Modified: 06 Sep 2022 12:33

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