Zigrand, Jean-Pierre and Danielsson, Jon (2001) What happens when you regulate risk?: evidence from a simple equilibrium model. Discussion paper, 393. Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Download (741Kb) | Preview
The implications of Value-at-Risk regulations are analyzed in a CARA-normal general equilibrium model. Financial institutions are heterogeneous in risk preferences, wealth and the degree of supervision. Regulatory risk constraints lower the probability of one form of a systemic crisis, at the expense of more volatile asset prices, less liquidity, and the amplification of downward price movements. This can be viewed as a consequence of the endogenously changing risk appetite of financial institutions induced by the regulatory constraints. Finally, the Value-at-Risk constraints may prevent market clearing altogether. The role of unregulated institutions (hedge-funds) is considered. The findings are illustrated with an application to the 1987 and 1998 crises.
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|