Minguez-Afonso, Gara (2006) Imperfect common knowledge in first generation models of currency crises. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (555). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Abstract
First generation models assume that the level of reserves of a Central Bank in a fixed exchange rate regime is common knowledge among consummers, and therefore the timing of the attack on the currency, in an economy with persistent deficit, can be correctly anticipated. In these models, the collapse of the peg leads to no discrete change in the exchange rate. We relax the assumption of perfect information and introduce uncertainty about the willingness of a Central Bank to defend the peg. In this new setting, there is a unique equilibrium at which the fixed exchange is abandoned. In our model, the lack of common knowledge will lead to a discrete devaluation of the local currency once the peg finally collapses.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://fmg.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2006 The Author |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F31 - Foreign Exchange G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2009 14:45 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 18:45 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/24509 |
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