Besley, Timothy and Coate, Stephen (1997) Analyzing the case for government intervention in a representative democracy. Theoretical Economics; TE/1997/335, TE/07/335. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Download (1260Kb) | Preview
The welfare economic method for analyzing the case for government intervention is often critized for ignoring the political determination of policies. The standard method of accounting for this critique studies the case for intervention under the constraint that the level of the instrument in question will be politically determined. We critize this method for its implicit assumption that new interventions will not affect the level of existing policy instruments. We argue that this assumption is particularly misleading in suggesting that political economy concerns must dampen the case for intervention.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 1997 by the authors|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Government intervention; public choice|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H10 - General
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|