Leahy, D. and Neary, J. P. (1995) Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries. CEPDP, 270. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper examines the free-market and socially optimal outcomes in a dynamic oligopoly model with R&D spillovers. First-best optimal subsidies to R&D are higher when firms play strategically against each other but lower when they cooperate on R&D (at least with high spillovers) and when they play strategically against the government. Second-best optimal subsidies to R&D are presumptively higher than first-best ones, but policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition is high.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 1995 the authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor|
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
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