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Collective bargaining under complete information

Diaz-Moreno, Carlos and Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E. (2000) Collective bargaining under complete information. TE, 401. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Identification Number: 401

Abstract

In this paper, we build and structurally estimate a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation for Spain. For large firms, the assumption of complete information seems a sensible one, and it matches the collective bargaining environment better than the one provided by private information models. The specification of the model with players having different discount factors allows us to measure their relative bargaining power, a recurrent question in the theory of bargaining. We find that both entrepreneurs and workers have high discount factors, and no evidence that entrepreneurs have bigger bargaining power as usually assumed.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 2000 the authors
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 12 Jul 2008 11:28
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 09:11
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19337

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