Hart, Oliver and Moore, John (2004) Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in. TE (472). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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Abstract
We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit not to consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are "ruled out". Ex post, they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifies no mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the list are not "ruled out". A "loose" contract (long list) maximizes flexibility but may interfere with ex ante investment incentives. When these incentives are important enough, the parties may write a "tight" contract (short list), even though this leads to ex post inefficiency.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2004 the authors |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor K Law > K Law (General) |
| JEL classification: | K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K12 - Contract Law L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Jul 2008 13:34 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 18:37 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19316 |
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