Berlinski, Samuel, Dewan, Torun and Dowding, Keith (2007) Individual and collective performance and the tenure of British ministers 1945-1997. PEPP, 25. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Download (237Kb) | Preview
We study the effects of individual and collective ministerial performance on the length of time a minister serves in British government from 1945-97, using the number of resignation calls for a minister as an individual performance indicator and the cumulative number of such calls as an indicator of government performance. Our analysis lends support to a ‘two-strike rule’: ministers facing a second call for their resignation have a significantly higher hazard than those facing their first, irrespective of the performance of the government. A minister’s hazard rate is decreasing in the cumulative number of resignation calls; but conditional on receiving a first resignation call, the hazard rate increases with the number of calls that all government ministers have faced in the past. Our message is that collective ministerial performance is a key determinant of whether a minister survives his first resignation call.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2007 the authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Sets:||Departments > Government
Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Research centres and groups > LSE Public Policy Group
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|