Work meaning and fair wages

Schouwer, Thimo De, Gsottbauer, Elisabeth, Kesternich, Iris and Schumacher, Heiner (2025) Work meaning and fair wages. Labour Economics, 97. ISSN 0927-5371

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Abstract

Work meaning can be an important driver of labor supply. Since, by definition, work meaning is associated with benefits for others, it also has an important fairness dimension. In a theoretical model, we show that workers’ willingness to pay for work meaning can be positive or negative, depending on the relative strength of fairness concerns and meaning preferences. To examine the importance of these behavioral motives for labor supply, we conduct a survey experiment with representative samples from The Netherlands and Germany in which we vary within-subject the benefits that a job creates for others. We find that only a minority of workers are actually willing to sacrifice wage for work meaning. The average willingness to pay for work meaning is positive, but substantially lower than the willingness to pay for job flexibility. There is a strong negative relationship between fairness concerns and willingness to pay for work meaning. Thus, individuals who prioritize fairness are less likely to accept lower wages for meaningful work.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Authors
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C90 - General M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues)
Date Deposited:	02 Oct 2025 09:36
Last Modified:	20 Oct 2025 18:22
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/129675

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