Non-stationary search and assortative matching

Bonneton, Nicolas and Sandmann, Christopher ORCID: 0009-0005-4697-2635 (2025) Non-stationary search and assortative matching. Econometrica. ISSN 0012-9682 (In Press)

Text (Non-stationary_Search_and_Assortative_Matching_FINAL) - Accepted Version Pending embargo until 1 January 2100. Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (2MB)

Abstract

This paper studies assortative matching in a non-stationary search-and-matching model with non-transferable payoffs. Non-stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of agents searching evolve endogenously over time. Assortative matching can fail in non-stationary environments under conditions for which Morgan (1994) and Smith (2006) show that it occurs in the steady state. This is due to the risk of worsening match prospects inherent to non-stationary environments. The main contribution of this paper is to derive the weakest sufficient conditions on payoffs for which matching is assortative. In addition to known steady state conditions, more desirable individuals must be less risk-averse in the sense of Arrow-Pratt.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Author
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	07 Jul 2025 07:24
Last Modified:	23 Jul 2025 09:03
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/128639

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