Campaign contributions and legislative behavior: evidence from U.S. congress

Parmigiani, Alberto ORCID: 0009-0002-0666-306X (2025) Campaign contributions and legislative behavior: evidence from U.S. congress. Journal of Public Economics, 243. ISSN 0047-2727

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Abstract

What is the relationship between campaign contributions and legislative behavior of elected representatives? In this paper, I find that more concentrated donations negatively correlate with three costly legislative endeavors of members of Congress: bill sponsorship, speechmaking on the floor and witness appearances before committees. For bill sponsorship, the negative correlation is stronger for topics related to redistribution, such as health and social welfare bills. To interpret these results, I argue that a more skewed structure of contributions makes members of Congress more dependent on their top donors and thus potentially more inclined to represent their interests. By reciprocating favors to donors, by seeking to secure their continued financial support, or simply by enjoying more leisure time as a result of feeling secure in their financial backing, federal legislators are less active in activities related to the Congressional agenda and public policy. Overall, I contend that campaign contributions distort the incentives of elected representatives to allocate legislative effort in Congress.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Author(s)
Divisions:	School of Public Policy ?? SCPP ??
Subjects:	J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States) J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare and Poverty > I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy
Date Deposited:	12 Feb 2025 14:21
Last Modified:	19 Feb 2025 17:03
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/127295

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