Signaling and discrimination in collaborative projects

Onuchic, Paula ORCID: 0009-0007-1818-5356 and Ray, Debraj (2023) Signaling and discrimination in collaborative projects. American Economic Review, 113 (1). pp. 210-252. ISSN 0002-8282

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Abstract

We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public’s credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant “identities.” We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. (JEL A11, D82, I23).

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2023 American Economic Association.
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A11 - Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education > I23 - Higher Education Research Institutions
Date Deposited:	08 Oct 2024 11:12
Last Modified:	04 Nov 2024 11:48
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/125652

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