Dynamically rational judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2024) Dynamically rational judgment aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare, 63 (3-4). 531 - 580. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and revision commute. We prove an impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are non-trivially connected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator satisfying some basic conditions. Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality counterpart of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator. Notably, premise-based aggregation rules are dynamically rational with respect to so-called premise-based revision operators.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2024 The Authors
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	H Social Sciences B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	16 May 2024 13:45
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 04:16
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/123458

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