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Does providing gig workers with unemployment insurance create a moral hazard?

Kolsrud, Jonas and Spinnewijn, Johannes ORCID: 0000-0002-7963-5847 (2024) Does providing gig workers with unemployment insurance create a moral hazard? LSE Business Review (29 Feb 2024). Blog Entry.

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Abstract

Non-standard workers doing short-term, flexible jobs are a growing segment of the labour force, which poses difficult questions. Is it good policy to provide unemployment insurance to them? Do people engage in gig work by choice? And should they be rewarded for it? Jonas Kolsrud and Johannes Spinnewijn explore the issue and argue that many gig workers are likely to have few resources other than unemployment insurance when they become jobless.

Item Type: Online resource (Blog Entry)
Official URL: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
Additional Information: © 2024 The Author(s)
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Date Deposited: 07 Mar 2024 11:18
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2024 03:14
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/122192

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