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Accountability through mutual attunement: how can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected?

Eriksen, Andreas and Katsaitis, A (2023) Accountability through mutual attunement: how can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected? Public Policy and Administration, 38 (3). 352 - 373. ISSN 0952-0767

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Identification Number: 10.1177/0952076720977606

Abstract

The increased authority delegated to independent agencies raises questions about the conditions of politically accountable governance, and specifically parliament’s role as a representative institution. Focusing on committee hearings as an accountability mechanism, we ask: How can a parliament employ hearings to ensure that the ends pursued by agencies have a democratic foundation? We propose a model of “mutual attunement” where accountability relations presuppose a process of working-out shared understandings of the ends, means and circumstances of policy needs. We test our argument through a case study assessing the interaction between the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs and the European Securities and Markets Authority. Theoretically, we contribute to discussions on agency accountability and European governance, while providing a novel conceptual model and the first analysis of its kind.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/PPA
Additional Information: © 2020 The Author(s)
Divisions: Government
Subjects: J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited: 05 Feb 2024 10:15
Last Modified: 22 May 2024 18:36
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/121645

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