Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs

Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit, Flesch, János, Predtetchinski, Arkadi and Solan, Eilon (2022) Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119 (11). ISSN 1091-6490

[img] Text (pnas.2105867119) - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (780kB)

Identification Number: 10.1073/pnas.2105867119

Abstract

We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0, provided that the set of players is finite or countably infinite and the action sets are finite. The proof relies on techniques from stochastic games and from alternating-move games with Borel-measurable payoffs.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://www.pnas.org/
Additional Information: © 2022 The Authors
Divisions: Mathematics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited: 21 Nov 2023 16:54
Last Modified: 17 May 2024 00:06
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120822

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics