Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit ORCID: 0000-0003-3896-4131, Flesch, János, Predtetchinski, Arkadi and Solan, Eilon (2022) Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119 (11). ISSN 1091-6490
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Abstract
We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0, provided that the set of players is finite or countably infinite and the action sets are finite. The proof relies on techniques from stochastic games and from alternating-move games with Borel-measurable payoffs.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://www.pnas.org/ |
Additional Information: | © 2022 The Authors |
Divisions: | Mathematics |
Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics |
Date Deposited: | 21 Nov 2023 16:54 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 03:50 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120822 |
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