Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs

Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit ORCID: 0000-0003-3896-4131, Flesch, János, Predtetchinski, Arkadi and Solan, Eilon (2022) Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119 (11). ISSN 1091-6490

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Abstract

We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0, provided that the set of players is finite or countably infinite and the action sets are finite. The proof relies on techniques from stochastic games and from alternating-move games with Borel-measurable payoffs.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.pnas.org/
Additional Information:	© 2022 The Authors
Divisions:	Mathematics
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited:	21 Nov 2023 16:54
Last Modified:	15 Nov 2024 22:57
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120822

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