Organizing data analytics

Alonso, Ricardo ORCID: 0000-0001-9559-0864 and Câmara, Odilon (2024) Organizing data analytics. Management Science, 70 (5). 3123 - 3143. ISSN 0025-1909

Text (Organizing Data Analytics_2023_05_26) - Accepted Version Download (776kB)

• Author
• Scopus publication

Abstract

We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main tradeoffs in organizing data generation, analysis, and reporting. In our designer-agent-principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, whereas the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection, and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and analysis.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/mnsc
Additional Information:	© 2023 INFORMS
Divisions:	Management
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M1 - Business Administration > M10 - General
Date Deposited:	17 Nov 2023 12:51
Last Modified:	12 Nov 2024 21:27
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/120780

Actions (login required)

View Item