Trading and information diffusion in over-the-counter markets

Babus, Ana and Kondor, Peter ORCID: 0000-0001-9797-9291 (2018) Trading and information diffusion in over-the-counter markets. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (777). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Text (DP777) - Published Version Download (1MB)

• Author
• https://www.fmg.ac.uk/publications/discu...

Abstract

We propose a model of trade in over-the-counter (OTC) markets in which each dealer with private information can engage in bilateral transactions with other dealers, as determined by her links in a network. Each dealer's strategy is represented as a quantity-price schedule. We analyze the effect of trade decentralization and adverse selection on information diffusion, expected profits, trading costs and welfare. Information diffusion through prices is not affected by dealers' strategic trading motives, and there is an informational externality that constrains the informativeness of prices. Trade decentralization can both increase or decrease welfare. A dealer's trading cost is driven by both her own and her counterparties' centrality. Central dealers tend to learn more, trade more at lower costs and earn higher expected profit.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2018 The Authors
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Date Deposited:	31 May 2023 09:06
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 19:45
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/118939

Actions (login required)

View Item