Dynamic asset-backed security design

Ozdenoren, Emre, Yuan, Kathy ORCID: 0000-0001-9895-7545 and Zhang, Shengxing ORCID: 0000-0002-1475-2188 (2022) Dynamic asset-backed security design. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (856). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

Borrowers obtain liquidity by issuing securities backed by current period payoff and resale price of a long-lived collateral asset. They are privately informed about the payoff distribution. Asset price can be self-fulfilling: higher asset price lowers adverse selection, allows borrowers to raise more funding which makes the asset more valuable, leading to multiple equilibria. Optimal security design eliminates multiple equilibria, improves welfare, and can be implemented as a repo contract. Persistence in adverse selection lowers debt funding, generates volatility in asset price, and exacerbates credit crunch. The theory demonstrates the role of asset-backed securities on stability of market-based financial systems.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2022 The Authors
Divisions:	Finance Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G10 - General G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G00 - General
Date Deposited:	18 May 2023 23:08
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 19:44
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/118859

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