The political economy of central bank independence

Romelli, Davide (2022) The political economy of central bank independence. LSE Business Review (06 Jan 2022). Blog Entry.

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Abstract

Central bank independence, which increased over the past 50 years around the world, has recently come under pressure. There have been numerous studies about the consequences of independence for monetary authorities, but the causes of reform have received less attention. Davide Romelli investigates why and how central bank reforms come about, using a cross-country database on the timing of legislative changes. He identifies a number of challenges, including the increase in nationalism, the large build-up of sovereign debt, and climate change.

Item Type:	Online resource (Blog Entry)
Official URL:	https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
Additional Information:	© 2022 The Author
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Date Deposited:	25 Mar 2022 14:45
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 03:25
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/114120

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