When central bank independence becomes a condition for International Monetary Fund loans

Reinsberg, Bernhard, Kern, Andreas and Rau-Göhring, Matthias (2021) When central bank independence becomes a condition for International Monetary Fund loans. LSE Business Review (30 Sep 2021). Blog Entry.

Text (businessreview-2021-09-30-when-central-bank-independence-becomes-a) - Published Version Download (51kB)

• https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2...

Abstract

Independent central banks tend to make anti-inflation policy promises credible and lead to greater economic stability. This is because they are bound by their legal mandates to price stability, while not competing for popular votes. Bernhard Reinsberg, Andreas Kern, and Matthias Rau-Göhring write that an independent monetary authority also insures against the misuse of International Monetary Fund bailout loans. Their research finds that following IMF programs conditioned on central bank independence, the political pressure regarding monetary policy eases.

Item Type:	Online resource (Blog Entry)
Official URL:	https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
Additional Information:	© 2021 The Authors
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Date Deposited:	08 Nov 2021 10:09
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 03:13
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/112249

Actions (login required)

View Item