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Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation

Verreault-Julien, Philippe (2021) Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation. Synthese, 199 (3-4). 10039 – 10057. ISSN 1573-0964

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s11229-021-03235-z


Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based — factive — explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual inferences is not a sufficient guide for accurate representation, factivity, or realism. I conclude by calling for a more explicit specification of model-world mismatches and properties imputation.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2021 The Author
Divisions: CPNSS
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited: 02 Jun 2021 09:51
Last Modified: 24 Feb 2022 19:03

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