Why would passive funds invest in corporate governance?

Friedman, Henry and Mahieux, Lucas (2021) Why would passive funds invest in corporate governance? LSE Business Review (27 Jan 2021). Blog Entry.

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Abstract

Ownership by passively managed funds has increased over the last 20 years. They are called passive because they hold stock in proportion to the company’s weight on a published index, such as the FTSE100 or the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Being tied to indexes means they cannot modify the weight of a specific company in their portfolio. Henry Friedman and Lucas Mahieux explore passive funds’ incentives to monitor the firms they invest in and present a nuanced view of the role that these funds play in firms’ corporate governance.

Item Type:	Online resource (Blog Entry)
Official URL:	https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
Additional Information:	© 2021 The Authors
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Date Deposited:	15 Mar 2021 14:33
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 02:45
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/108691

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