Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma

Shreedhar, Ganga ORCID: 0000-0003-2517-2485, Tavoni, Alessandro ORCID: 0000-0002-2057-5720 and Marchiori, Carmen (2020) Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma. Environment and Development Economics, 25 (1). 66 - 94. ISSN 1355-770X

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Abstract

With the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ‘imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/environmen...
Additional Information:	© 2019 Cambridge University Press
Divisions:	Psychological and Behavioural Science Geography & Environment Grantham Research Institute
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services; Biodiversity Conservation; Bioeconomics D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
Date Deposited:	11 Dec 2019 11:42
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 02:00
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102877

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