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Judgementalism about normative decision theory

Thoma, Johanna ORCID: 0000-0002-1364-4521 (2019) Judgementalism about normative decision theory. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s11229-019-02487-0


Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they supervene on an agent’s mental states, and in particular those she can reason from. I argue that even if we grant such internalism, attitudes other than preferences in the judgementalist sense rationally constrain choice. This ultimately supports a different interpretation of preference.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2019 The Author
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited: 20 Nov 2019 12:48
Last Modified: 15 Sep 2023 16:18

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