Judgementalism about normative decision theory

Thoma, Johanna ORCID: 0000-0002-1364-4521 (2019) Judgementalism about normative decision theory. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857

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Abstract

Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they supervene on an agent’s mental states, and in particular those she can reason from. I argue that even if we grant such internalism, attitudes other than preferences in the judgementalist sense rationally constrain choice. This ultimately supports a different interpretation of preference.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/journal/11229
Additional Information:	© 2019 The Author
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	20 Nov 2019 12:48
Last Modified:	15 Nov 2024 19:06
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102568

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