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A unificationist defence of revealed preferences

Vredenburgh, Kaitlyn Ann (2020) A unificationist defence of revealed preferences. Economics and Philosophy, 36 (1). 149 - 169. ISSN 0266-2671

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Identification Number: 10.1017/S0266267118000524


Revealed preference approaches to modelling agents’ choices face two seemingly devastating explanatory objections. The no self-explanation objection imputes a problematic explanatory circularity to revealed preference approaches, while the causal explanation objection argues that, all things equal, a scientific theory should provide causal explanations, but revealed preference approaches decidedly do not. Both objections assume a view of explanation, the constraint-based view, that the revealed preference theorist ought to reject. Instead, the revealed preference theorist should adopt a unificationist account of explanation, allowing her to escape the two explanatory problems discussed in this paper.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2019 Cambridge University Press
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Date Deposited: 16 Sep 2019 11:45
Last Modified: 19 Jul 2024 00:42

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