A unificationist defence of revealed preferences

Vredenburgh, Kaitlyn Ann ORCID: 0000-0001-5721-5609 (2020) A unificationist defence of revealed preferences. Economics and Philosophy, 36 (1). 149 - 169. ISSN 0266-2671

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Abstract

Revealed preference approaches to modelling agents’ choices face two seemingly devastating explanatory objections. The no self-explanation objection imputes a problematic explanatory circularity to revealed preference approaches, while the causal explanation objection argues that, all things equal, a scientific theory should provide causal explanations, but revealed preference approaches decidedly do not. Both objections assume a view of explanation, the constraint-based view, that the revealed preference theorist ought to reject. Instead, the revealed preference theorist should adopt a unificationist account of explanation, allowing her to escape the two explanatory problems discussed in this paper.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-...
Additional Information:	© 2019 Cambridge University Press
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Date Deposited:	16 Sep 2019 11:45
Last Modified:	20 Oct 2025 22:33
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/101625

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