Casting conference calls

Cohen, Lauren, Lou, Dong ORCID: 0000-0002-5623-4338 and Malloy, Christopher (2020) Casting conference calls. Management Science, 66 (11). 5015 - 5039. ISSN 0025-1909

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Abstract

We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that “cast” their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and more future earnings restatements. A long–short portfolio that exploits this differential firm behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points per month or almost 18% per year. We find similar evidence in an international sample of earnings call transcripts from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan. Firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and their executives) that are about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise options are all significantly more likely to cast their earnings calls.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/mnsc
Additional Information:	© 2020 INFORMS
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Date Deposited:	08 Jul 2019 16:06
Last Modified:	15 Nov 2024 08:24
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/101136

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